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Economic War and Democratic Peace 
 
Abstract 
Research has shown that democracies rarely if ever engage each other in war and are less 
likely to have militarized disputes than when interacting with authoritarian regimes.  
Economic sanctions are an alternative to militarized conflict viewed by the masses as 
more acceptable.  The conflict-inhibiting effects of democratic norms and institutions are 
thus weakened with respect to the use of sanctions.  This paper examines whether a 
country’s decision to initiate sanctions is influenced by its regime type as well as that of 
the potential target.  The results indicate for the period 1950-1990 that the more 
democratic a country is the more likely it is to initiate sanctions.  Democracies, though, 
are less likely to target other democratic regimes relative to non-democratic regimes.  
With respect to sanctions use, pairs of democracies are not peaceful.  
 
KEY WORDS:  economic sanctions, democratic peace, trade interdependence.   
 
JEL CODES:  D74; F51; H56 
1.  Introduction 
Immanuel Kant envisioned that a world of democracies would be characterized by 
peace.  Democratic governments, unlike their authoritarian counterparts, he argued, 
promote peace as they allow the citizenry that face the burdens of war to directly 
influence the decision to go to war.  Today Kant’s legacy lives on as policymakers and 
researchers alike recognize the relation of democracy and peace.  This notion of a 
democratic peace is that norms and institutions of democratic regimes, when paired with 
other democratic regimes, form shared values of friendship and compromise, which 
promote nonviolent interactions.  Support for this is based on the historical absence of 
wars between democratic countries (Babst, 1972; Small & Singer, 1976) and the results 
of numerous empirical studies (Goenner, 2004; Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, & Russett, 1996; 
Oneal & Russett, 1997, 1999a) that find democratic pairs of states are less likely to 
engage in militarized disputes than are other pairs.  This has led some (Levy, 1988) to 
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describe the empirical version of the proposition as the closest thing in international 
relations to a law.   
A recent question of interest is whether this law like relation extends to forms of 
international relations other than militarized conflict.  Farber and Gowa (1997) for 
instance have found that democratic pairs of countries are more likely to be allies.  
Democracies are also more likely to share membership in non-governmental 
organizations (Russett, Oneal, & Davis, 1998), vote more similarly in the United Nations 
(Oneal & Russett, 1999b), have more open trade policy (Mansfield, Milner, & 
Rosendorff, 2000), and trade more (Morrow, Siverson, & Tabares, 1998).   
Busch (2000) and Reinhardt (2000), though, challenges the notion that democracy 
contributes to positive economic interactions.  Reinhardt’s (2000) analysis of the 
initiation of GATT disputes finds that democratic pairs of states participate in more trade 
disputes and are less likely than other pairs of countries to resolve them cooperatively.  
Similarly, Busch (2000) finds that pairs of democracies are more likely to escalate trade 
disputes and are less likely to settle their disputes by offering concessions.  These 
findings suggest that democracies, while never at war, may substitute economic for 
militarized forms of conflict.    
The purpose of this paper is to examine the monadic and dyadic relationships 
between political regime type and the initiation of economic sanctions during the period 
1950-1990.  Analyzing directed dyads, we find that democratic regime type is related to 
sanctions use in a complex way.  The monadic results indicate that increasing the level of 
democracy increases the probability that a country initiates sanctions.  Democracies 
though are significantly more likely to target non-democratic regimes than they are other 
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democracies.  Despite this finding, democratic pairs of countries are not peaceful with 
respect to the use of sanctions as they are more likely to use sanctions than authoritarian 
pairs of countries.    
2.  Sanctions and the Democratic Peace  
The economic sanctions cases examined here were collected by Hufbauer, Schott, 
and Elliott (1990, p.2) and include sanctions that were used to achieve foreign policy 
goals.  Cases are described as “the deliberate, government inspired withdrawal, or threat 
of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial resources,” where foreign policy goals 
“encompass changes expressly and purportedly sought by the sender state in the political 
behavior of the target state.”1  The typical foreign policy goals for using sanctions are to 
obtain a change in policy, destabilize, or impair the military potential of the targeted 
country.  Examples used for these purposes include sanctions initiated by the US against 
Britain and France seeking their withdrawal from the Suez, sanctions imposed by the US 
against Nicaragua to destabilize the Sandinista government, and sanctions imposed by 
NATO countries on several Eastern Bloc countries to prevent the proliferation of 
strategic technology.   
Economic sanctions include both trade and financial controls.  Trade sanctions are 
used to deny exports to the target and reduce imports from the target.  The effects of their 
use will depend on the substitutability of the goods and markets in question.  In cases 
where substitutes are not readily available for the target, such as sanctions imposed on 
Iraq after the first Gulf War, the effects can be devastating.  Export controls tend to be 
used more frequently than import controls because an initiating country is more likely to 
be the dominant producer, rather than consumer of a good.   The denial of strategic goods 
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is also an important reason export controls are frequently imposed.  Financial controls 
involve actions such as the denial of development aid, access to credit, and the freezing 
of assets.  Of the 111 sanctions cases examined by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990), 
24 used trade controls alone, 32 financial controls alone, and 55 used both types. 
To understand the use of sanctions one must realize that regimes maximize their 
wellbeing over a set of policy choices, which includes the use of diplomacy, economic 
sanctions, and war.2  Regimes considering the use of sanctions weigh the utility from 
initiating sanctions relative to alternatives.  This indicates the possibility of foreign policy 
substitution (Most & Starr, 1985), where factors that contribute to the use of sanctions in 
one setting may lead to war in another.  While sanctions are often perceived as ineffective 
(Huffbauer, Schott, & Elliott, 1990; Morgan & Schwebach, 1997; Pape, 1997), their use 
may be dictated by the setting.  Of particular concern in this paper is whether 
democracies, which are constrained in their use of war with each other, substitute 
economic for militarized forms of conflict.   
The democratic peace proposition asserts that political regime type influences 
interaction among countries in a way such that the characteristics found in democracy 
foster peaceful interaction. 3  Maoz and Russett (1993) consider the two most important 
of these characteristics to be democratic norms and institutions, where norms reflect 
common beliefs and institutions provide constraints by channeling interactions.   
Norms are a typical behavior pattern and in the context of the democratic peace it 
is asserted that interactions which take place within a country influence how they interact 
with others.  This relation Weart (1998) believes is part of the human need for 
consistency.  Within democratic regimes, boycotts and strikes are two economic forms of 
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conflict that are viewed as acceptable responses to transgressions.  Boycotts, similar to 
import sanctions, involve the refusal to purchase a firm’s goods or services and are used 
to obtain policy changes.  A strike is similar in effect to export sanctions, as individuals 
refuse to sell their labor to firms.  It is not surprising then that democratic countries in 
1974 blocked attempts by the Soviet Union to expand the UN definition of aggression to 
include economic measures.  Today, democratic norms view economic sanctions as a 
preferred means of dispute resolution.  Perhaps over time this may change, similar to 
values that once accepted dueling as a means of settling disputes.     
Institutions may work to constrain a country’s decision to initiate sanctions.  
Democratic institutions provide the means for citizens to ensure that their chosen 
representatives carry out their wishes.4  Actions that are costly to citizens, such as war, 
generate significant public debate that constrains the ability of democratic leaders to act.  
Economic sanctions, unlike militarized acts, are easily reversible and take a great deal of 
multilateral coordination to have long term effects.  The effects of sanctions at home and 
abroad are difficult to quantify as compared with militarized acts, which can produce 
images of destroyed homes and casualties on the nightly news.  While trade sanctions do 
impose costs on domestic markets, the costs are most often borne by a small number of 
domestic firms competing in the export market in which controls are imposed.  
Democratic leaders thus face fewer institutional constraints in the use of economic 
relative to military force.  This weakening of checks and balances is evident in the US, 
where the Export Administration Act of 1979 and its revisions authorize the President to 
initiate export sanctions on goods in order to promote US foreign policy objectives.    
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Democratic norms, which support the use of economic sanctions to achieve 
foreign policy goals, combined with a lack of institutional checks, suggests that 
democratic countries are more likely to use sanctions than countries with mixed or 
authoritarian regimes, with all else equal.  Despite their willingness and ability to use 
sanctions, democracies may be reluctant to initiate sanctions on other democracies, which 
share an affinity for compromise and the peaceful settlement of disputes.  Dixon (1993, 
1994) and Raymond (1994), for example, have shown that democracies are more likely 
than other countries to seek third party intermediation to settle disputes.   
Use of an intermediary does not necessarily result in compromise.  Busch (2000) 
finds trade disputes between democracies brought before GATT are more likely to 
escalate beyond the initial consultation stage to the formation of a formal panel.  Further, 
conditioning on the formation of a panel, pairs of democracies are no more likely than 
other regime pairs to offer concessions, despite their willingness for third party 
adjudication before GATT.  This behavior by democratic regimes, with regards to the use 
of sanctions, may be primarily a response to the public’s demands to do something 
(Renwick, 1981; Nossal, 1989).  Sanctions imposed under GATT are initiated solely at 
the request of domestic interest groups that seek enforcement of current trade agreements.  
Countries impose this type of sanction to appease domestic interests (Goldstein & Martin, 
2000; Haftel, 2004), knowing that such acts are unlikely to affect international relations.5  
The type of sanctions examined here differs in this respect as they are driven more by 
international relations (Drezner, 1998, 1999; Drury, 2001) and a desire to coerce.6   
Democracies may impose sanctions on each other without fear of further 
escalation or domestic unrest.  Reducing the cost of sanctions, though, may make their 
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use more likely.  The stability-instability paradox is that stability among pairs of 
democracies, with respect to militarized conflict, could contribute to their increased use 
of economic sanctions.7  This reduction in costs also affects the ability of democratic 
regimes to credibly signal to each other their resolve using threats of economic sanctions.  
Fearon (1994) and Smith (1998) believe that leaders of democratic countries face higher 
audience costs, allowing them to rely more frequently on words rather than actions.  
Without audience costs, threats become little more than cheap talk.  Constrained and 
unable to demonstrate resolve, pairs of democracies may find themselves more likely to 
use economic sanctions than other pairs of countries.   
3. Analysis of Economic Sanctions Initiation 
  The empirical analysis examines sanctions episodes drawn from Hufbauer, 
Schott, and Elliott (1990), which provide 111 case studies of economic sanctions used for 
foreign policy goals throughout 1914-1990.  Their case studies attempt to include all 
known instances of sanctions of this type, though the authors recognize that sanctions 
used between states of the second and third world may have been omitted.8  Each of the 
case studies indicate for our coding purposes the initiator(s) of sanctions and the 
corresponding target(s) along with the years in which sanctions were imposed.   
The unit of observation is a directed dyad year, where the sample includes all 
directed pairings of countries for each year.9  Both directions are included, which implies 
that our dependent variable codes separately both whether the US initiated sanctions 
against Canada in a given year and whether Canada initiated sanctions against the US.  
The reason for the distinction is that sanctions episodes, unlike militarized actions, are 
typically one sided and do not involve retaliation.  We examine the post world war period 
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1950-1990 because it is during this period in which economic interactions are said to 
have increased in importance as part of international relations.  1990 is selected given it is 
the last year that sanctions data are available.  The sample contains over 560,000 
observations.   
The analysis examines the onset of economic sanctions as well as their continued 
use.  This allows one to determine whether there are differences in the factors that 
influence the initiation and the continuation of disputes (Beck, 2003; Beck, Katz, & 
Tucker 1998; Oneal & Russett, 1999a).  “Onset” sets the first year that economic 
sanctions are initiated by a country against another equal to 1 and drops from the analysis 
all other observations of the same dispute.  Multiple sanctions episodes are possible 
during a year, which results in an overlap of disputes.  In such cases, the first year of the 
subsequent dispute is also included in the analysis as an onset of a dispute.  
”Involvement” sets each year economic sanctions are used by one country against another 
equal to 1.   
The independent variables used in this analysis control for the willingness and 
ability of countries to engage in economic sanctions.  Motivation influences whether 
conflict of a certain type is politically feasible, while capability constraints determine if 
action is physically feasible.  Controls typical to the study of militarized conflict are used 
here to analyze economic conflict.  Understanding the conditions that influence the use of 
force will help us to understand the use of economic sanctions.  Data for the independent 
variables was obtained from the dataset used by Oneal (2003) to analyze militarized 
disputes.   
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Regime type data are taken from the Polity III data set (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore, 
1990).  A single measure for regime type is created by subtracting the autocracy score 
from the democracy score and adding 10, so the transformed measure ranges from pure 
autocracy (0) to pure democracy (+20).  In our analysis we examine separately the effects 
that the regime types of the initiating country and target have on sanctions use.   An 
interaction term, which is the product of each country’s regime scores, is included to 
control for the effect of shared democratic characteristics.   
Additional independent variables are included.  Allies is a binary variable that 
takes the value 1 if the states in the dyad have formally agreed to a defense pact, 
neutrality pact, or entente as defined by the Correlates of War (COW) project.  Formation 
of an alliance requires agreement on a common goal.  Common interests increase the 
benefits of compromise, thereby promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes.  These 
alliances though may not prevent the use of economic sanctions, as regimes constrained 
from war by an alliance may resort to their use.  This may be particularly true given 
Hufbauer et al’s (1990) finding that sanctions are generally more successful when allies 
are targeted.  Thus we posit that regimes constrained from militarized conflict by 
alliances may be more likely to use economic sanctions.   
Contiguity and distance capture the idea that conflicts of interest typically involve 
neighboring states.  Contiguity is coded 1 if countries share a border or are separated by 
less than 150 miles by water either directly or via dependencies.  We expect to find that 
countries are more likely to initiate sanctions against neighboring countries.  Distance 
measures the great circle distance between country’s capitals or in some cases ports.  One 
would expect that increasing distance would reduce the opportunity for disputes to form 
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between countries.   The capability ratio has been used to measure a country’s means to 
engage in military war and is the logarithm of the capability ratio of the larger to lower 
state.  One would expect the larger the ratio, the less likely a dispute will escalate to the 
use of sanctions.  Separate variables are included to control for whether the initiating or 
target countries are major powers.10  One expects these countries, which are active in 
global affairs, to be more likely to initiate as well as be targeted with sanctions.      
Researchers are increasingly interested in the effects of trade on conflict between 
countries.11  Increasing a country’s dependence on trade with another country is said by 
classical liberals to create economic and social ties that bind countries’ interests and 
inhibit conflict.  Gartzke and Li (2003) offer that economic integration improves a 
country’s ability to send costly signals and demonstrate resolve during disputes.  The idea 
is that threats to sever trade or impose sanctions frighten financial markets, producing 
significant economic costs to countries integrated into the world economy.  Threats made 
by countries dependent on trade are thus more credible, reducing the need for action.  
Empirical analysis of MIDs by Gartzke and Li (2003), using alternative measures of 
economic integration, generally supports this notion.  We expect that increasing a 
country’s dependence on trade with another country reduces their likelihood of initiating 
sanctions.   
 A country’s ability to effectively use economic sanctions as a policy tool depends 
on the targeted country’s dependence on the initiating country for trade.  Hufbauer et al. 
(1990, p. 99) find for the sanctions episodes they examine that the initiating country 
accounts for 28% of the target’s trade in successes, compared to 19% in failures.  In a 
game theoretic model, Crescenzi (2003) shows that increasing a country’s economic ties 
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increases their likelihood of being targeted with low level conflict, which includes the use 
of economic sanctions.12  Crescenzi also conducts logistic regression analysis of low 
level dyadic disputes controlling for the targeted country’s import inelasticity and trade 
share along with an interaction term for the two controls.13  Increasing the inelasticity of 
import demand and trade share together significantly increase the likelihood of low level 
conflict.   
Here we measure country i's dependence on country j’s trade as the sum of the 
pair’s bilateral exports and imports divided by country i's GDP.  Data for bilateral exports 
and imports as well as GDP are from Gleditsch’s (2002) expanded trade dataset.  One 
expects country i, the potential initiator, to be less likely to impose sanctions against 
countries they are dependent on for trade.  Additionally, one would expect that a country 
is more likely to be targeted with sanctions from a country they depend on for trade.   
Finally we include in the analysis four variables that are designed to control for 
the duration dependence of observations.  The idea is that the longer countries have 
interacted peacefully the less likely they will engage in conflict.  Following the 
recommendation of Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) a natural cubic spline of the previous 
years of economic peace is formed with three knots, which generates the four peace year 
variables.   
4.  Results 
To determine the effects that democratic norms and institutions have on the use of 
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where country i represents the potential initiator and country j the potential target in each 
pair of countries.   The independent variables, excluding the peace year variables, have 
all been lagged one year to avoid problems associated with regressors, such as trade at 
time t, which may be influenced by the dependent variable at time t.  We examine both 
the initial onset and continued involvement of economic sanctions.  Logistic regression is 
used to model the probability that sanctions are initiated or continued.  Huber robust 
standard errors that cluster on each directed dyad are provided along with the coefficient 
estimates in Table 1.   
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
From the monadic perspective we examine whether democracies are empirically 
more likely than authoritarian and mixed regimes to initiate sanctions.  The marginal 
effect of increasing a country’s level of democracy on their initiating sanctions is 







∆  (2) 
The inclusion of the target’s regime type in equation 3 is due to the measure of joint 
democracy, the product of the two countries’ regime type scores.14  For the onset of 
sanctions, the value of equation 3 ranges from .0141 for fully democratic targets (DEMj = 
20) to .1161 for fully non-democratic targets (DEMj = 0).  The positive value throughout 
the entire range of regime values indicates that increasing a country’s level of democracy 
increases their likelihood of initiating sanctions, unconditional of the regime type of their 
target.   Similar calculations are made for the prolonged involvement of economic 
sanctions, where values range from -.0601 to .1379 for fully democratic and non-
democratic targets, respectively.  The breakpoint at which the effect changes from 
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negative to positive occurs at a regime type score of 14.  For our sample, the majority of 
countries (65%) have regime scores less than 14 and on average equal 8.86. The regime 
type characteristics of the interstate system thus suggest that the monadic effect of 
democracy on sanction’s use is positive.  The more democratic a country is the more 
likely they are to use sanctions.   
 Democracies, while prone to using sanctions, are found to be significantly more 
likely to use sanctions against non-democratic countries, relative to other democracies.  
The negative coefficients for β3 in Table 1, along with equation 3, indicate that the 
marginal effect of increasing a country’s level of democracy on their initiation and use of 
sanctions is reduced the more democratic the targeted country.  Pairs of democracies 
though are not characterized as peaceful when it comes to the use of economic sanctions.  
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the complex interaction between shared 
regime type and the onset and involvement of economic sanctions for a pair of countries 
with the mean level of characteristics.  The figure indicates that democratic countries are 
more likely to initiate sanctions than non-democratic and mixed regimes and are 
particularly prone to initiate sanctions against non-democratic countries.  With respect to 
sanctions involvement, the figure takes the shape of a saddle, where democratic and non-
democratic pairs of countries are less likely to use sanctions than democratic/non-
democratic or mixed pairs.   
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 The quantitative effects can be further seen in Table 2, which provides for 
comparison the probability of sanctions use for various regime type pairs.  The 
probability for each group is formed using the means of each of the variables, other than 
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regime type, along with the logistic regression estimates.  From these results one sees that 
a country that becomes fully democratic from the mean level (DEMi = 10) increases the 
probability they initiate sanctions against a country with mean regime type (DEMj = 10) 
by (.000154-.00008)/.00008 = 93% compared to (.00008-.000071)/.00008 =13% for a 
fully democratic country.  With respect to the prolonged involvement of economic 
sanctions, a country that becomes fully democratic from its mean level is 48% more 
likely to use sanctions against a country with a mean level of democracy, whereas it is 
45% less likely to use sanctions against another democratic country.  Overall, democratic 
pairs are 194% more likely than non-democratic pairs and as likely as mixed pairs to 
suffer the onset of sanctions.  For involvement, democratic pairs are 156% more likely 
than non-democratic pairs to be involved in the prolonged use of sanctions and are 40% 
less likely to use sanctions than mixed pairs.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 With respect to the other control variables the results of the analysis are largely 
what one would expect.  Major powers are more likely to initiate and to be the target of 
economic sanctions.  Increasing the military capability ratio was found to reduce the 
probability that sanctions are used.  Perhaps somewhat surprising is the finding that 
alliance ties have a positive effect on the use of sanctions, which is statistically 
significant with regards to their onset.  This likely reflects the idea that economic 
sanctions serve as an alternative means to send a message without the threat of breaking 
military ties. The effects of trade dependence are mostly found to be insignificant.  For 
the onset of sanctions, the coefficient for the initiating country’s dependence is positive, 
whereas for involvement the sign is negative, as predicted.  The dependence of the target 
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has a positive effect on both the onset and involvement of sanctions as predicted, but is 
only significant in the former sample.  Distance and contiguity are the only two variables 
that vary significantly between sanctions onset and involvement.   With respect to onset, 
the coefficient for contiguity is negative, while for distance it is positive and significant.  
These estimated effects are reversed when it comes to involvement in sanctions.   
Longstanding disputes that involve sanctions are more likely to be between contiguous 
countries and those separated by less distance.   
5.  Conclusion 
In the post world war period the utility of militarized acts as an instrument of 
policy has diminished.  This decline is due in large part to the increased destructiveness 
of militarized conflict (Knorr, 1966).  Economic sanctions are an alternative, short of 
war, that countries can use to achieve foreign policy goals.  While economic relations 
have historically been an important part of international relations, Baldwin (1985) finds 
little modern interest in the study of economic statecraft.  Globalization though has led to 
renewed interest in economic interactions, such as US trade with China.  Knowledge of 
the factors that contribute to the use of sanctions is important to understanding the future 
of international relations.   
The empirical findings suggest that countries may substitute economic for 
militarized forms of conflict in disputes that begin far from home and those between 
allies.  Alliance ties and distance both have a positive and statistically significant effect 
on the onset of sanctions, whereas these effects are negative with respect to militarized 
disputes (Oneal & Russett, 1999a).  The concern examined here is whether democratic 
norms and institutions, which inhibit militarized conflict, allow democracies to substitute 
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the use of economic sanctions in their disputes.  Democratic norms are more accepting of 
economic forms of conflict and as such fewer normative and institutional constraints are 
placed on the use of sanctions.  The results indicate that democracies are significantly 
more likely to initiate sanctions than non-democratic countries.  Despite their willingness 
to use sanctions, democracies are significantly more peaceful with each other than they 





1 Hufbauer et al. (1990, p. 2) exclude cases in which positive incentives are used along 
with those involving foreign policy goals that are part of the “normal realm of economic 
objectives sought in banking, commercial, and tax negotiations.” 
 
2 Baldwin (1985) believes these choices are considered in order by decisionmakers.   
 
3 Ray (1995) and Chan (1997) provide a detailed review of the democratic peace 
literature 
 
4 Seven institutions that Dahl (1989, p. 221) argues are necessary for the highest 
attainment of democracy are; 1) elected officials, 2) free and fair elections, 3) inclusive 
suffrage, 4) right to run for office, 5) freedom of expression, 6) alternative information, 
and 7) associational autonomy 
 
5 Commercial rivalry such as the “Cattle War” fought between the US and Canada in 
1974 involved the United States applying counter tariffs in response to discriminatory 
tariffs from Canada.   
 
6 Drury (2001) argues that the lack of public attention paid to the use of sanctions and 
foreign policy more generally makes it unlikely that sanctions examined here are used as 
a means to placate domestic interests.    
 
7 The stability-instability paradox was originally applied by Snyder (1965) to nuclear 
deterrence.  Mutually assured destruction implied that conventional war was unlikely to 
escalate to the nuclear level, reducing the cost of conventional war.  The reduction in cost 
made conventional war more likely.  I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for 
this point.   
 
8 Analysis of pairs consisting of a major power did not reveal any significant difference. 
   
9 Oneal and Russett (1997) analysis of militarized disputes examines what they refer to as 
politically relevant dyads; pairs of states that are either contiguous or contain a major 
power.  Given sanctions can be easily applied, near and far, we believe the larger sample 
to be more suitable.  Analysis of politically relevant dyads did not qualitatively change 
the results reported.   
 
10 Singer and Small (1994) define the major powers as USA, China, USSR, UK, and 
France during the period examined, 1950-1990. 
 
11 Barbieri and Schneider (1999) and Mansfield and Pollins (2001) provide a review of 
the empirical literature.  See Schneider, Barbieri, and Gleditsch (2003) and Mansfield and 




12 Crescenzi’s (2003) develops a two stage sequential game that models a country’s 
decision to escalate beyond economic to militarized force.   At each stage the challenger 
(initiating country) can choose to make a demand accompanied by a threat.  The first 
stage threat includes low levels of conflict (denial of trade), while the second stage threat 
involves the use of militarized force.   The target has the ability to accept or reject the 
demand and the challenger may back down.  The payoffs to the model are such that 
increasing the target’s dependence (exit cost) increases the likelihood of sanctions (low 
level conflict) and decrease the likelihood of militarized disputes (high level conflict).   
 
13 Dispute data are drawn from the World Events Interaction Survey.   Data for import 
elasticity is only available for a small sample of countries.   
 
14 Greene (1997, pp. 391-392) provides a discussion of the interpretation of marginal 
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Table 1:  Logistic regression results from modeling the Onset and Involvement of Economic    
Sanctions 1950-1990 
 
 Onset   Involvement 







DEM(i) 0.1193** 0.0228 0.1379** 0.0260 
DEM(j) 0.0421 0.0299 0.1064** 0.0314 
JNTDEM -0.0054* 0.0024 -0.0099** 0.0022 
Allies 1.0347** 0.2430 0.0672 0.2759 
Contiguity -0.4382 0.4125 0.9534** 0.3550 
Distance 0.3046* 0.1524 -0.5621** 0.1324 
Capability Ratio -0.1692** 0.0527 -0.2799** 0.0580 
Dependence(i) 0.0933 2.6339 -33.1060 21.1453 
Dependence(j) 1.5770* 0.7397 0.4939 1.5636 
Major Power(i) 3.3609** 0.2323 3.7327** 0.2212 
Major Power(j) 2.0085** 0.4241 1.7952** 0.3728 
Spline1 -0.0020 0.0019 -0.0337** 0.0028 
Spline2 -0.0007 0.0015 0.0208** 0.0019 
Spline3 0.0013* 0.0006 -0.0031** 0.0006 
Peace Years -0.4152** 0.1072 -2.398** 0.1765 
Constant -11.0752** 1.2508 -0.3761 1.1018 
     
Log likelihood -1117   -3462  
Pseudo R2 0.2162   0.6103  






Table 2: Probability of the Onset and Involvement of Economic Sanctions by Political Regime Type, 
1950-1990 
           
Onset  DEMj  Involvement DEMj 
  0 10 20    0 10 20 
 0 0.000027 0.000041 0.000063   0 0.000005 0.000014 0.000040
DEMi 10 0.000090 0.000080 0.000071  DEMi 10 0.000019 0.000020 0.000022
 20 0.000296 0.000154 0.000080   20 0.000075 0.000030 0.000012
 
Note: DEMi = regime type of initiating country  
          DEMj = regime type of target 
          Variables, other than JNTDEM, are evaluated at their means.   

